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As the Australian Defence Force (ADF) prepares to leave combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014, a question 
arises as to who our next enemy might be. For what contingencies should the ADF train? How should our 
forces be organized, equipped, commanded and deployed in the interval between 2014 and the next possible 
assignment? Shall we prove to be very good at preparing to fight our latest war, which will probably never 
repeat itself, or might we be able to take a well-founded look into the future and prepare the ADF for the 
challenges it will actually have to face?
Major Tasks
Looking ahead I can see four major types of task for the ADF: defence of our sovereign territory; contribution 
of contingents to larger international forces, both regionally and globally; counter-insurgency operations; and 
disaster relief. This is not to say that I agree that all of these types of task should be undertaken, but it is only 
realistic to accept that they probably will be required of the ADF should future Australian governments be 
anything like their predecessors. Let me turn to each of these four tasks in turn and consider ways in which 
they might arise, the nature of probable enemy use of force against us, the skills and capacities required by the 
ADF, and the organization and support it will need to succeed in carrying out each of these missions.
Defence of Sovereign Territory
The first and most basic requirement for the ADF is to be able to defend Australian sovereign territory. Only 
once, in 1942, has our sovereignty been under severe threat. The nature of world politics is changing however, 
and international society in the 21st century could prove to be dangerous for a large, well-endowed but sparsely 
populated country like Australia. Population pressures, environmental degradation, climate change and bad 
government are likely to cause international conflicts in ways that have not arisen often in kinder eras, when 
populations were not so dense and the world’s food production capacity was not under threat from other 
activities such as mining and chemical spills. Demand for minerals and energy will rise and place more pressure 
on international relations, and the major powers may well seek to strengthen their own bases for competition 
with others by, in effect, taking over and exploiting medium and smaller powers. Australia could face threats 
rather like those which confronted weaker states of the 18th and 19th centuries.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Australia has to use the post-Afghanistan period to create a foundation on which we can base our 
security over the decades ahead. The ADF needs to focus on raising the costs of major power 
aggression, while sustaining counter insurgency, coalition and disaster relief skills. Significantly higher 
spending will be required to ensure national security, though building the public case is a task for 
Government leaders not the Defence Department or the ADF.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
•	 The ADF needs to be prepared for four main tasks: defence of Australian sovereign territory;  
assist larger international forces; counter-insurgency; and disaster relief.
•	 With rising demand for land, resources and food, Australia is at greater risk of threats from major 
powers.
•	 The ADF needs to continue developing the skills of operating effectively in the Middle East and  
South-west Asia.
•	 The ADF needs to study and work with the forces of our allies, especially in the matter of command 
and control for each of its tasks.
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The recently published Australian Defence White Paper does not analyze this type of threat to our security nor 
its implications for our defence strategy, force structure and national infrastructure. The White Paper focuses its 
discussion on multilateral threats, which fit well with the security context of the past sixty years, but which may 
not be as dominant over the coming sixty years as unilateral dangers. If large countries with huge populations 
experience diminishing availability of food, energy and other vital resources, their natural inclination might be 
to look around for another large country which has much smaller population pressures on its available food 
supply and resources, and decide simply to march in and take it all over. Who would spring to our defence 
in that situation? The answer is not as clear and certain as in the case of action that directly threatens other 
state interests in our region, especially if the “other state” includes the United States (US). Thus Australia has a 
relatively new kind of defence problem to live with, which can challenge our capacities severely.
As experts in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) said in the 1970s, we cannot prevent threats 
to our sovereignty from arising but we can make it so difficult for would-be aggressor powers to have their way 
that they will be deterred from striking against us. This means that we must maximize the difficulties of crossing 
the sea and air gap surrounding Australia, as well as being able effectively to contest attempts at lodgment on 
land, especially in areas close to potential enemies in northern and western Australia.
Therefore the ADF needs a strong maritime defence component (navy and air force) as well as highly survivable 
forces on land. These forces need to train to meet advanced enemies who intend to make limited scale attacks 
on us. Our aim is to deter attack rather than always to be able to defeat an attack using maximum force. At 
that level it becomes a challenge for our major ally.  We need naval, air and land bases to support defence 
operations in our most vulnerable and vital regions. But even these modest goals will require Australia to build 
and maintain substantial air and naval forces. These forces will be expensive to procure and maintain, and 
complex to operate. Recent levels of defence expenditure will not suffice for our national security in the future. 
Also the basing and support infrastructure requirements for the defence of our most vulnerable areas are 
substantial, and these will create further demands for increased defence expenditure. We could also benefit 
from partnership arrangements with allies and other friendly powers in terms of training, major exercises and 
equipment procurement.
Contribution to international forces, regionally and globally
Experience has shown that the most frequent demands on the ADF are likely to come from allies and other 
friendly powers who need help – especially of a political nature.  The United States does not need Australian 
participation in order to turn around its prospects for victory in the field, but we can make a difference (which 
is appreciated) by showing that we approve of the cause for which US forces are committed, and can at least 
make a modest contribution to their success.
While I appreciate that many Australians would prefer 
the Government to minimize such commitments, 
none the less we have to be able to meet this sort of 
demand occasionally. In the case of Korea, Australia 
and all other members of the UN Command alliance 
there, are obliged by the Joint Policy Declaration of 
27 July 1953 to return to the battlefront should North 
Korea renew its attack on the South. Indeed, Kim 
Jong-un has said he will do just that, and that the Armistice Agreement is null and void in his view. Perhaps 
the Joint Policy Declaration no longer has much force or binding power, but this outcome cannot be assumed. 
Australia needs to be able to operate credibly and effectively with the US and other partners, especially South 
Korea, if its international friendships are to yield positive results.
More controversially, the ADF needs to continue developing the skills of operating effectively in the Middle East 
and South-west Asia against a wide variety of possible enemies, ranging from major national conventional 
forces, such as those of Iraq and Iran, to subnational insurgents such as Al Qaeda and other Jihadis. While 
some of Australia’s terrain and climate closely resembles those of the Middle East, the complicating human 
dimension is missing from the local scene. Units of the ADF will need to refresh their Middle Eastern experience 
if they are to remain capable of operating there.
“ Recent levels of defence expenditure 
will not suffice for our national security 
in the future. ”
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One special category of international operation  
that may present itself is assistance to maintain  
the credibility of the United Nations (UN), or to restore 
its authority. While the UN faces many critics today, 
especially in the United States, it was, after all an 
American creation, and the world would be much the 
worse off were it to lose its authority and capabilities 
to help smaller powers and underdogs around the 
world. Discharging this responsibility could require 
the ADF to be able to operate over much of Africa, 
the Middle East, South and Central America, and the smaller island states of the Indian, Pacific and Atlantic 
oceans, in company with a wide range of other national partners. The types of operation required are likely  
to cover a wide part of the spectrum ranging from conventional to counter-insurgency operations, on land,  
at sea and in the air. 
Let me now look at possible counter-insurgency tasks for the ADF.
Counter-insurgency locally and regionally
Counter-insurgency operations in themselves cover a wide spectrum, ranging from aspects of the Australian 
assistance program for the Solomon Islands Government over the past decade to the much higher profile 
operations of the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Australia has been involved in counter-
insurgency operations for a long time, beginning with the Malayan Emergency. We have learned much over 
the past sixty years and have won international praise for our skill and effectiveness in this field, The best way 
to learn counter-insurgency techniques is to practise them, and this will also be a special requirement for the 
training of the ADF, both in Australia and abroad. Because it is a wide and potentially controversial field, it  
would help if the ADF’s counter-insurgency specialists could train and operate with others who are skilful at  
this business.
Given the high level of disorder that has existed in the Middle East over the past two decades, it is not 
difficult to imagine that there will be calls for Australian participation in counter-insurgency operations in that 
region. While the ADF should have the capacities to engage in such operations successfully, the Australian 
Government will have to be careful not to commit the Force to conflicts which are either inherently unwinnable, 
or liable to escalate into major regional wars beyond the level that United States public opinion will support.
The nature of counter-insurgency techniques will change as societies change. Like conventional military 
operations, new strategies and tactics are constantly evolving and training programs must take this factor into 
account. Some of this training can take place within Australia but it will also be important for counter-insurgency 
forces to hone their skills in the island states of the South Pacific, as well as in more distant regions which are 
being threatened by more powerful insurgencies, especially in the Middle East, South-west Asia and Africa. 
Training outside Australia should allow for co-operation with potential allies and less formal partners, and it 
needs to be done at a high level of proficiency, or the ADF’s carefully built reputation might be damaged. It 
will be important that ADF personnel train and work with our allies, so that allied weaknesses and inherent 
differences in our approaches to insurgency problems are recognised and dealt with before we have to 
commence a new round of operations with other friendly forces. 
New training programs must embrace the increasing role of social network media in connecting potential 
dissidents, i.e. politically and socially active young people, thereby possibly playing to a strong side of our own 
response capacity. But we must not take this for granted. Dissidents and insurgents can easily develop their 
skills in different ways and directions to ours.
Disaster relief
A fourth category of operational tasks for the ADF in the years ahead will be disaster relief. As populations 
grow, and climate change becomes more of a factor in determining whether our living environment is benign or 
dangerous, the ADF will, inevitably, have to assist with rescue and sustenance operations, in Australia and the 
“ While the UN faces many critics 
today the world would be much the 
worse off were it to lose its authority 
and capabilities ”
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South-west Pacific, South-east Asian, Indian Ocean 
and African regions. It may also have to develop, take 
charge of and implement major works programs to 
rectify the effects of harsh climate and geophysical 
change such as urban damage, floods, storms, 
bush-fires, volcanoes and tsunamis. Famine relief, 
reinforcement of public health programs and the 
containment and treatment of diseases are also likely 
tasks for the ADF in years ahead. 
These factors, reinforced by persecution and the poor quality of governments in many countries, are likely to 
lead to significant movements of people seeking refuge for their families and better prospects for themselves. 
While we may have great sympathy for those involved directly in this flow of humanity across the seas to 
Australia, it has none the less to be controlled. The ADF has to play a major part in the controlling mechanism. 
This role will become more difficult and delicate politically as refugees learn more about the techniques of 
gaining a foothold in the desired refuge country, and build more support in the international community. Hence 
the training and deployment requirements of this task are likely to grow over the decades ahead.
Command and Control Arrangements for these Tasks
All of these tasks are complex, and the delivery of their hoped-for beneficial impact will depend heavily on the 
knowledge, skills and quality of Australian armed service leadership. This leadership, in turn, can only function 
properly within the context of a national or allied command structure, suitably located, protected and provided 
with high capacity, secure communications and information handling technology. We need to do much more 
work on developing this national command structure, and training the men and women who are to command 
and staff it. We also need to study and work with the forces of our allies, especially in the matter of command 
and control for each of these four varieties of task.
We must also be able to field contingents made up of multiple armed services under Australian command if we 
are to retain a degree of national identity and control. For some missions, particularly disaster relief, the ADF will 
need to be able to work with appropriate civil agencies. In some cases it may have to co-operate with privately 
owned businesses and companies.
Training Requirements
The training challenges facing the ADF in developing useful response capacities for each of these four types 
of task are formidable, particularly if we wish to stand on our own feet and not see ourselves simply as an 
incremental addition to the power of larger allies. A considerable amount of the training required for the ADF 
can be done in Australia, thanks to its large surface area, diversities in climate and vegetation, and the length of 
its coastline. Also, once a certain level of proficiency has been achieved, much of the further training required 
can be done in a study, a classroom or through modestly sized field exercises. The effectiveness of training 
at this more modest numerical level will depend greatly on the knowledge and intellectual qualities of those in 
command and their directing staff, but other armed forces have shown us how to develop successful tactics 
and strategies without their full complement of troops. 
We need to encourage and support the development of discussion groups (or brains trusts) of bright 
servicemen and women to keep developing new operational ideas, particularly in response to the impact of 
new technology which might be used against them.
Diverse exercise areas will be necessary for ADF training across Australia, and they must be supplemented 
by international (particularly regional) experience. Australian diplomats will have to win regional co-operation 
in the training of defence forces including the ADF. If this mission is carried through successfully, there should 
be adequate training facilities and opportunities available across the South-east Asian and South-west Pacific 
regions. But to realize this vision, Australia will need to convince its neighbours that it stands ready to assist 
them in maintaining their own security, without any attempt at or appearance of undercutting their sovereignty 
and independence.
“ nothing is more important than good 
ideas and well-trained leaders to put 
them into effect. ”
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Other Preparations for the Challenges
This focus on preparations of the armed forces must not ignore the political and social context in which 
future military operations will have to be conducted. Political leaders will need to develop their own expertise 
in commanding and administering the kinds of operations discussed above. Few politicians these days have 
personal experience of military operations, and those lacking in this dimension would be well advised to spend 
time with the ADF on exercises within Australia and internationally. They will need especially to be able to make 
their own assessments of the adequacy of our military leaders so that when replacements seem justified by 
poor results, our political leaders can select military successors wisely and confidently.
Government leaders need to be able to build and retain the support of the Australian people for whatever 
operations the ADF is committed to. This requirement calls for a dialogue in which other types of opinion 
leaders outside the major political parties will be involved. The roles of the research institutes and universities 
will be important in this regard. They will need to be drawn into the dialogue and listened to. The media also 
have a prominent part to play, and the government needs to help media specialists to do their job expertly, and 
not expect them simply to form a chorus of approval.
And there are many more specialised contributions to be made by people and agencies outside of the ADF 
which can assist the military’s performance in operations, such as intelligence, communications, logistical 
support and industrial capacity. Space does not permit me to develop thoughts on these aspects of the ADF’s 
future training and work, but they are complex and vital to our future security.
Finally there are the financial provisions that have to be made to pay for our security. Anyone who has studied 
Cabinet papers in the period since the Second World War knows what a powerful constraint finance has been 
on the long-term development of the ADF in times of peace. If we are going to have any serious capacities for 
being other than an appendage to the forces of the United States and other great powers, we are going to  
have to spend considerably more than we have been doing over the last two decades. Building the case for 
higher defence expenditure is a task for Government leaders, not the Defence Department or the ADF. The 
recent Defence White Paper is in many ways a very sensible document, but its objectives will not be reached 
without a more sustained national commitment to supporting the people, equipment and real-estate that the 
Force needs.
In Conclusion
The challenges ahead of the ADF in maintaining Australia’s security and supporting  international order will be 
diverse and formidable.  As an independent nation, largely responsible for maintaining its own security, Australia 
has to accept these challenges and use the post-Afghanistan period to create a foundation on which we can 
base our security over the decades ahead. While the challenges will be testing, potential enemies will not face 
easy choices if we prepare ourselves well. Numbers of service personnel, the capability of their equipment and 
the strength of its financial support will all be important. But as history has shown, nothing is more important 
than good ideas and well-trained leaders to put them into effect.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Australia has to use the post-Afghanistan period to create a foundation on which we can base our 
security over the decades ahead. The ADF needs to focus on raising the costs of major power 
aggression, while sustaining counter insurgency, coalition and disaster relief skills. Significantly higher 
spending will be required to ensure national security, though building the public case is a task for 
Government leaders not the Defence Department or the ADF.
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